A tale of two Daar's

In the current atmosphere of "blog wars" in certain circles, the feverish blogging and counter-blogging can easily polarise views and introduce unwarranted prejudice and entrenchment of positions. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the latest debate between a prominent Islamist defector and (members of) his former Islamist group.

Although the debate had the potential to be intellectually stimulating and beneficial to all parties, it has inadvertently perhaps, managed instead to stir up a cloud of dust, obscuring what is arguably the main argument at the core of the dispute; the argument that has yet to be thoroughly explicated and thrashed out: the debate about the realm of applicability of the Shairah.

While I shall not be attempting to address this core argument here, there is merit in trying to cut through this whole Daar malarkey, not in order to resolve it, but in order to prevent it from obscuring our judgement on the more fundamental debate ... if it ever happens. I'll start by presenting a synopsis of what (in my opinion) the Daar debate is all about and the premise upon which it is based, and then explore what the possible outcomes of a successful discussion can be, and comment on the relevance of any such conclusions.

The defector is basically attempting to use Islamist reasoning and juristic principles to challenge their claim that the current Muslim regimes are (definitively) illegitimate. The aim would thus appear to be to undermine the legal basis for those Islamists claiming to work politically towards regime change instigated by the military, followed by a forced unification of neighbouring Muslim lands, as accusations of Kufr and the shedding of blood require (according to the Islamist juristic principles presented) positions that are definitive in nature. Contained within his thesis is an accusation of this particular Islamist group of (politically-motivated) theological and idelogical incoherence and manipulation.

The Islamist response is as expected: a thorough and detailed exposé of the first claim, challenging the suggestion that the group methodology is based on contested terminology and an indecisive binary division of the world. The implication, naturally, is that their methodology is entirely consistent with not only the cult's own juristic principles, but also those of the classical Islamic scholars, and as such it is justified in its claim of being the panacea for the problems of the world, or at least the vehicle for it. And as if to seal the discussion, the writer goes on to personally discredit the defector by casting doubts about his intentions, intellect, scholarly integrity and loyalty.

The counter-Islamist argument, in my opinion, founders before it even starts, on two counts:

1. It relies on Islamist precepts and builds upon an Islamist (as opposed to an Islamic) premise, as if the protagonist is attempting to beat the Islamists at their own game, so to speak. From the outset, given his known anti-Islamist stance, the author is vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy and intellectual insincerity, eroding the credibility of his case before it is even presented. This is a fine example of how not to present a Trojan horse.
2. It attempts to dismantle the central tenet of an ideological organisation, the so-called "secret of it's very existence" no less. Cults are known to be obsessively protective about all aspects of their culture, and going for the jugular in this manner will invariably trigger multiple defense mechanisms. Amongst all the possible outcomes, to have the party allow a legalistic argument from a declared enemy to undermine and subvert its central doctrine is clearly the least plausible. This applies to members of the group just as it applies to the party itself.

The best that could possibly be achieved by this argument, assuming I was wrong on both points above, is that a number of Islamists question the group methodology, and come to one of the following conclusions:

1. Daar-ul-Islam already exists, and the argument for revolutionary regime change to bring about Daar-ul-Islam is unsustainable, hence the way forward is by armed insurrection against the regimes for their implmentation of Kufr laws.
2. Daar-ul-Islam already exists, and the laws being applied by the Muslim rulers fall short of the legal criteria for clear-cut Kufr, hence the way forward is engaging in peaceful internal political reform.
3. Daar-ul-Islam does not exist, however the non-definitive nature of this judgement precludes the use of force in bringing it about even via a military coup, hence the way forward is by grassroot political activism to bring about societal change that will reflect itself in regime change eventually (the original adoption of the party prior to 1961).

None of these outcomes seems particularly appealing from the point of view of a secular politician arguing for the separation of religion from ruling. With little prospect of achieving more than the above modest gains, one wonders why the debate was started in the first place.

To the casual observer, all this talk about Daar this and Daar that seems little more than a dispute over jargonistic technicalities. Many people would see these labels as simply words used to describe different aspects of something known to all by default; the only reason for defining these terms is because there are different rulings that apply in each of these lands. Daar-ul-Islam was defined by listing some of the known attributes of where the Muslims lived, and Daar-ul-Harb was simply defined as everything else, i.e. the "other" in a binary world.

In some ways its like defining what it meant to be "alive": rather than define it, biologists simply listed some characteristics of what they understood to be living things, and then defined "dead" as anything that did not posses those qualities. If the biologists were faced with the possibility that they themselves were not "alive", based on their own definition, they would naturally adapt their definition rather than accept the paradoxical situation being suggested. In a similar (but different) way, not having such a place as Daar-ul-Islam must never have occurred to the classical jurists.

The Daar debate will certainly continue for some while yet, as both parties have yet to exhaust their repository of arguments. I hope, however, that we can swiftly move on from this technicality to discuss the more important issue of the role of the Sharia in political life.

Did you say "Kufr"?

In an earlier posting, it was suggested that the area of dispute between the active advocates of an Islamic state (referred to here as the Islamists) and between the mainstream Muslims (who I've called the secular majority) is in fact not as large as it might first appear. Dogma, rhetoric, exaggeration, mistrust and conflicts of interest all serve to polarise opinions and entrench positions. The disagreement is seen to boil down to 3 fundamental areas:

• Should Islam be used as the reference for all actions, or are some areas not covered by the jurisdiction of the Shariah? Critically, the role of Islam in organising affairs of ruling and politics is disputed.


• Does man have the right to legislate, or is legislation for Allah alone?


• Can legislation be taken from "other than Islam", and is that "ruling by Kufr"?

Here, I'd like to pursue the third point, about ruling by Kufr, as this is used by some groups as a trigger to justify armed rebellion against the state, and by others as the fulcrum upon which they rest the (Islamic) validity of a ruler or state, thus taking action to bring about unrest, disobedience and a change of ruler. Whatever their differences, the Islamists are united in their conviction that this particular point is critical, and justifies the spilling of Muslim blood.

"Ruling by other than what Allah revealed" and "ruling by Kufr" are pretty much synonmous, but are by no means self-explanatory. It's almost impossible to obtain a clear statement explicating what exactly ruling by Kufr involves. Indeed, neither is it clear why "judging" is confused with "ruling", nor is it understood how Kufr can be attributed to a rule.

Given the critical nature of this matter, it's worth looking at it more closely. Note that this is a rational (as opposed to a textual) discussion. Here are some plausible interpretations of actions (carried out by a ruler) which may or may not fall under this "Kufr" category:

• Inflicting unwarranted harm or suffering upon the subjects.


• Passing legislation to inflict the same.


• Failing to punish subjects for committing sins for which there is no Hadd (Sharia punishment).


• Ordering subjects to carry out such sins, but without compulsion.


• Punishing people for not carrying out such sins.


• Passing legislation for the same.


• Failing to implement a Hadd.


• Delivering a punishment other than the Hadd for the same offence.


• Passing legislation for the same.


• Passing judgement in a matter not explicitly contained within the Sharia, without reference to the Sharia texts.


• Passing judgement in a matter with an explicit Sharia ruling, without reference to the Sharia texts.


• ...(there must be others)

To give an idea about the degree of ambiguity involved, less than a third of the cases listed involve judgement, less than a third involve legislation, and less than a third involves a direct contradiction of a known Sharia ruling. None of the actions, in themselves, would cause the ruler to leave Islam, as actions alone are insufficient for this.

As for what the ruler's beliefs regarding the legitimacy of those laws which contradict explicit Sharia rules, these can only be known if explicated directly by the ruler. If the ruler were to declare unequivocally that his laws were superior to the Sharia laws, then he ruler himself - and not his laws - would be labelled a disbeliever (Kaafir), and the legitimacy of his authority would be nullified by this. As for the laws themselves, they might well be referred to as "Kufr laws", in recognition of the fact that the ruler is a Kaafir, but the laws themselves do not have the characteristic of Islam and Kufr, they're simply laws.

However, if the ruler does not make such a public statement, then he must continue to be considered a Muslim, and the above would no longer apply. His actions alone can only be described as halaal or haraam, and clearly (almost) all the actions in the list above are haraam, causing the ruler to be sinful (and in a functional state, accountable), but a sinful ruler is nevertheless a legitimate ruler, and is still owed obedience, provided he qualified for this at some point.

The details of each of these cases warrants a separate discussion; suffice here to make the general point that "ruling by other than what Allah revealed" and "ruling by Kufr" are ambiguous statements, bordering on the meaningless, and their use by the unqualified or the unscrupulous, can not only be misleading, but can have disastrous consequences. However, it is the Islamists themselves who suffer from the ambiguity of this statement, and I hope that by working together to clarify and qualify it, both sides can come to appreciate that the gulf dividing them is, in fact, not that wide after all.

Related Thought For The Day postings at tftd.ws:

• Illegal or Haraam?
• Which is worse?
• "Lash their backs!"